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ABSTRACT
In the post-9/11 environment, organizations are acutely aware of the need to secure their supply
chains from risks of being a target of, or an unwilling participant in, a terror attack. However, supply
chain security (SCS) comes at a cost and increasing levels of protection have increasing levels of
costs to the firm. So some firms engage in strategic initiatives to secure the supply chain (SC) while
others do not; and each firm engages in varying degrees of activities to ensure SCS. Therefore, in
this study, the researchers sought to explore what types of SCS strategies exist. The researchers
analyze 162 responses to a SCS survey completed by executives from a broad range of firms and
industries and identify three general SCS strategies: Advanced, Laggards, and Compliant.
Implications for researchers and practitioners are presented.
INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11, 2001 were a
catalyst for change in many supply chain
operations. Supply chain security issues and
initiatives have affected numerous firms (Yang
and Wei, 2013). At a minimum, firms want to
protect their property and investments. From a
larger perspective, firms want to protect society.
Clearly, no firm wants its name permanently
linked to the next 9/11-like attack. However,
Supply Chain Security (SCS) can be difficult to
understand and ultimately implement. SCS is
unique because if it is working well, it remains
virtually invisible. As a result, little is known
about SCS strategies.
Understanding strategy is at the core of supply
chain research (Christopher et al. 2006; Tokman
et al. 2007) and it is through firm strategy

formulation that cost/benefit considerations are
weighed (Tang, 2006). But supply chains,
particularly those that are multimodal, are vastly
complex (Scholliers et al. 2012), where a
multitude of firms in any given network will
employ a myriad of strategies. As a result,
academicians have dedicated efforts to
understanding them, and in some cases guiding
them. Research on supply chain strategies has
examined the relationship between corporate
strategy and SCM (Hofman 2010); logistics
strategies (Autry et al. 2008) and logistics
activities in relation to firm performance (Lynch
et al. 2000); postponement versus speculation
(Pagh and Cooper 1998); and changes to strategy
based on environmental factors (Atwater et al.
2010).
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Most research on SCS strategies falls into the
latter category: changes to strategy based on
environmental factors. The stream of research
on SCS strategies is growing. Empirical work
has led to a greater understanding of SCS
strategies in the food industry (Whipple et al.
2009) and in transportation (Voss et al. 2009b).
Empirical research has also uncovered
antecedents to implementing SCS practices
(Williams et al. 2009a), SCS as an
organizational culture (Williams et al. 2009b),
and the development of a SCS orientation (Autry
and Bobbitt 2008), among others.
Williams et al. (2008) reviewed the literature on
SCS and highlighted several issues related to
this research. First, there are few empirical
studies on SCS, but SCS practices and strategies
may be difficult to capture because firms avoid
discussing SCS. This may be because firms
want to conceal their practices to keep them
secure, but it may also be because they want to
conceal that they have no real strategy and no
real practices.
Second, research on SCS has a narrow scope and
focuses on few industries, often only one
industry. The industries most often studied are
those most likely to engage in SCS, so it may not
present a holistic view of SCS. For example,
Whipple et al. (2009) focus on the food supply
chain. This excellent study, while insightful,
gives results only for the food industry and the
findings may not apply elsewhere. In addition,
Martens et al. (2011) use food firms as a control
variable in their research, which might indicate
that food firms have lower levels of perceived
security performance than do other firms.
However, most firms and most industries have
likely been affected by SCS, whether they
welcome the effects or not; the number of
security practices and government programs are
evidence of this. Thus, a broader cross section
of industries will give a better perspective on
SCS, what firms are doing, and how SCS affects
outcomes.
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Third, SCS practices are often prescribed based
on norms that lack a research foundation. For
example, Helferich and Cook (2002) suggest
firms approach SCS the way the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
approaches disaster management. FEMA
prepares for disruptions through planning,
mitigation, detection, response, and recovery; a
layered approach that goes beyond deterrence
and prevention. Sarathy (2006) and Sheffi
(2005b) support a different kind of layered
approach, one where each layer of security
enclosed still another, so if the first is breached,
a second or third still remains to protect the
chain. This normative work is an important step
in developing a research foundation on SCS. It
establishes a point from which empirical work
can begin and offers important starting points for
practitioners who are trying to figure out what to
do next in a climate that has changed radically
after 9/11.
Given the gaps in previous research, along with
recent calls for more strategic supply chain
research (Fawcett, Waller, and Bowersox 2011),
the current study has the following objectives:
first to analyze primary survey data from
respondents representing a broad range of firms
and industries and second; to determine what
SCS strategies, if any, exist among the broad
range of firms. The following sections review
literature on SCS and SC strategy and present
the methods and analysis used in the study
before discussing the results and implications for
researchers and practitioners.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review highlights the key points
in SCS research that are tied to the objectives of
this study. It is not intended to be a
comprehensive review of SCS literature. For a
comprehensive review of the SCS literature,
readers are referred to Williams et al. (2008).
SCS Research
SC management requires security because of the
complexity, dependence, and extended trust and
commitment between SC partners (Sarathy

2006); and although individual firms have
created SCS measures within the firm, these
measures fail to address the rest of the SC
(Sheffi 2005a). Unfortunately, to date, the
logistics and SCM literature have been slow to
provide help in understanding SCS and best
practices (Closs and McGarrell 2004; Hale and
Moberg 2005). In summarizing existing SCS
literature, Rice and Spayd (2005) suggest that
three themes emerge: little empirical evidence,
many examples of reaction to past events, and
no investigations into current corporate
responses.
SCS Strategy
It would be hard to argue that SCS should be
initiated as an organizational strategy (Trunick
2005), but SCS strategies remain remarkably
clear. The normative work from the earliest part
of the century is partly responsible for this.
When Helferich and Cook (2002), described the
need for SCS strategy in terms of FEMA’s
approach to disasters, they laid out a clear path
for those in need of immediate help and security.
This and other early work on the subject (e.g.,
Sheffi 2005a) foreshadowed some strong
empirical work.
Martens et al. (2011) surveyed 62 executivelevel supply chain personnel and found that
proactive security approaches, internal and
external security planning, vulnerability of
nodes, and measuring security performance are
all significant influencers of security
effectiveness. Their finding also indicates that
the control variable of “firm type” leads to
effectiveness outcomes and that firms involved
in the food industry find lower levels of
perceived security effectiveness than do firms in
other industries.
Also, in a comprehensive analysis of 199
respondents (which remains as one of the largest
data sets in SCS research), Voss et al. (2009b)
evaluated the strategic security nature of the
firm, internal and external approaches to SCS,
and perceived security performance; and found
two clusters—high and low performing supply

chains—that related to security performance.
They found when firms place more importance
on security they also perceive more security
implementation and better security performance.
Voss et al (2009a) examined 130 responses in a
conjoint analysis concerning supplier selection
and SCS. Their responses came from
purchasing managers, members of the Institute
of Supply Management (ISM) and the American
Purchasing Society (APS). They found
differences in buyer preferences for security
versus price and delivery reliability along two
characteristics: 1) domestic versus international
sourcing; and 2) concern or lack of concern over
previous incidents experienced by the firm. For
domestic sources, buyers chose price over
security, although the results were mixed—
importance scores supported this result, but
market simulations did not. In the simulations,
buyers who were concerned about prior
incidents did trade price for higher levels of
security. For domestic sources, buyers
unequivocally chose high reliability over
advanced security, even if they were concerned
about prior incidents.
For international sources, buyers were more
likely to choose advanced security over price
and even to choose advanced security over
delivery reliability. Voss et al. (2009a) suggest
that the price/reliability dichotomy for choosing
suppliers remains strong and that security does
not overwhelm either. Firms seeking the lowest
price may move away from security if it adds to
costs. Firms seeking high delivery reliability
may choose in favor of advanced security, but
only if it does not compromise delivery
reliability in domestic trade. In international
trade, buyers may compromise delivery
reliability for advanced security. The authors
noted that these results may not apply in other
industries (Voss et al. 2009a).
Williams et al. (2008) expanded on the
dichotomous, internal-external approach to
strategy. They found four major categories of
strategic focus in SCS: firms that stress intraSpring/Summer 2012
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organizational activities (internal), firms that
stress inter-organizational activities (external),
firms that stress both (combination), and firms
that ignore SCS altogether.
Elements of SCS Strategy
Security techniques and tactics range from
purchasing mandated requirements for supplier
security, to locks and RFID tags, to security
audits, and participation in government
programs like C-TPAT (e.g., Voss et al. 2009b).
The following represent some of the most
important security practices discussed in the
literature.
SCS Culture
Arguably, SCS culture may be the most
important and most heavily researched area in
the field (e.g., Rice and Spayd 2005, Quinn,
2003, Christopher and Peck, 2004; Sheffi,
2005b; Williams et al. 2009b). Previous
research has shown the need for creating a SCS
culture (Sheffi 2002; Sheffi 2005b) and for
rewarding such buy-in (Whipple et al. 2009).
Failure to reward buy-in to the SCS culture can
allow security programs to become stale (Quinn,
2003) or to be abandoned. Williams et al.
(2009b) suggest a culture of security is critical to
SCS. Practitioners have responded similarly.
For example, Schneider International, a leading
transportation and 3PL provider, boasts of
building a culture of security in their overall
effort to secure the SC (Ritchey 2010). In the
current study, SCS culture is defined as the
overall organizational philosophy that embraces
and projects norms and values that protect the
SC and engage employees in protecting the SC
(Williams et al. 2009b).
Security Communication
SCS depends on the efforts of many firms
throughout the SC (Closs and McGarrell 2004),
so firms must communicate to share vital
information. As a result, to build security, firms
must develop communication strategies to share
that information (Closs et al. 2008). When
supply chains have communication plans in
place and share security related information,
10
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increased security cooperation and reduced risks
are likely to result (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008).
The sharing of critical information can be used
proactively (to prevent a security breach) or
reactively (to minimize a breach or assist in
response).
Examples of communication and information
sharing include: setting security expectations and
sharing these expectations among SC partners;
developing a common security communication
infrastructure (e.g., EDI requirements, GPS,
RFID technology); sharing real-time SCS
monitoring/detection status information (e.g.,
Homeland Security Advisory System); providing
feedback from security audits; providing
communications that direct SC efforts in a
coordinated response to a security threat; and
sharing communications that enable SC partners
to begin recovery from a disaster (Helferich and
Cook 2002).
Organizations that are working together in the
physical flow of goods rely on one another for
sharing and disseminating information. Security
requirements have increased information sharing
and communication expectations. Security
communication is defined as the ability for all
SC members to grant, share, and transmit critical
information to one another to ensure that the SC
will be protected.
Operational Modification
Goods now flow through the supply chain in a
different way because firms have adopted SCS
strategies. These changes, labeled operational
modifications, have been necessary to secure the
supply chain. A wide range of activities have
been modified for security. Examples of
operational modification include reducing or
increasing the amount of inventory held at a
given stocking location. For instance, some
firms are increasing all inventory levels as a
safety precaution while others are only
increasing “critical supplies.” Other firms have
decentralized inventory by adding inventory
stocking locations to reduce risk. Sheffi (2002)
proposed the notion of a dual inventory system.

In this system, a small amount of inventory
designated as strategic emergency stock is held
and only used in extreme situations to keep
operations running. These modifications to
inventory policies have a resulting impact on
transportation decisions as well.
Other firms have made drastic changes to
manufacturing operations. Williams (2008)
suggests that some firms are moving to JIT
manufacturing models to reduce inventory
levels. The reduced levels of inventory provide
less opportunity for security breaches. However,
Martha and Subbakrishna (2002) suggest that
JIT operations results in extra risk because a
disruption may lead to a production shutdown
and, as a result, customer dissatisfaction and
defection. Also, some firms are developing
redundant production capabilities for critical
products or contingency production capability
(Helferich and Cook 2007). Regardless, the
notion is the same: firms are making changes so
they can feel more secure.
Transportation operations have seen security
changes as well. Some firms have made
decisions to change modes to improve shipment
security. Rather than reduce cost and introduce
potential security breaches, some shippers have
switched to speedier, safer modes, such as air,
for their shipments. Recent pirate attacks on
ocean shipments and the resulting insurance
increases have accelerated this practice.
Williams (2008) also provides examples of
shipments of caravans (deploying a group of
trucks out at once) and increased usage of
truckload shipments (fewer touch points) as
other operational changes to transportation.
Overall, operational modification is defined as
changes to core SC activities, including
operational procedures, manufacturing,
inventory levels, and/or transportation in an
effort to create SCS.
Access Restriction
Access restriction is an SCS activity that
involves limiting where, when, and how people
can enter SC facilities, use SC equipment, or

touch materials, equipment and facilities (Min,
2012). This is in congruence with other research
and initiatives (e.g., ISO 28001: 2007) that
mentions tactics such as: controlled access
points, employee verification, special doors and
gates, card readers, visitor procedures, finger ID,
gate passes, and limiting access for both internal
and external personnel. This activity can be
described as knowing who has access to what at
all times, thus resulting in increased security.
Access restriction can be considered critical
because it provides a better understanding of
who is entering SC facilities, where they can go
once inside, what is being brought into SC
facilities, and what information and materials are
getting out. Specifically, this may include
restricting the access of visitors, vendors, truck
drivers, and even in some cases, a firm’s own
employees. By allowing unknown people only
in known areas, firms are reducing the
possibility of any unauthorized personnel
introducing contraband into the supply chain.
Therefore, access restriction helps secure an
organization by letting everyone know who and
what enters their physical locations.
Security Services
Increasingly, firms have become interested in
outsourcing security activities. These
outsourcing security initiatives are a key to the
way that firms create SCS. Most firms lack
expertise in security, so they seek partners who
have the expertise. The rationale is much the
same as for outsourcing other logistics or SC
activities. Security firms have the expertise in
one or more areas of security; firms in most
other industries do not have people with this
level of expertise.
Many firms outsource security services for
special situations (escorting high-value
shipments) or for guarding facilities and
transportation full-time. Steinman (2004) found
that half of 103 senior executives in his survey
of transportation firms would hire firms that
specialize in physical security services.
Williams (2008) found that these security firms
might provide armed secure transport, helicopter
Spring/Summer 2012
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escort of truck shipments, off-duty police and
ex-military personnel at facilities, employee or
candidate background check services, and
installation of monitoring equipment. Partnering
with these firms helps to create a secure supply
chain. External security services are defined as
the outsourced protection of the SC to firms or
people who specialize in such protection.
Security Inspection
The process of inspection can be viewed as
assuring that everything is in the proper order
and operating condition to permit the secure
operation of the SC. Examples of inspections
include: physical inspection of goods, tampering
inspections, and tiered inspections. These
inspections are conducted by using human
efforts and technology, such as metal detectors.
This process is intended primarily to prevent SC
disruptions.
Inspection is a broad security effort. For
manufacturers and retailers, inspection could be
evaluation of inventory and inspection of
deliveries. For manufacturers, inspection could
be the evaluation of production activities to
ensure no contraband has been introduced into
those operations. For transportation providers,
inspection may be verifying the physical
contents and quantity of shipments and assuring
that no contraband is being moved. SCS
Inspection is defined as checking products,
operations, and processes to prevent security
breaches.
METHODOLOGY
Following is a discussion of the measurement
variables and the sample collection.
Measures
In this study, a survey instrument used new
construct measures for the independent variables
of security communication, operational
modification, access restriction, security
services, and security inspection. Another
independent variable used in the study, Supply
Chain Security Culture (SCSC), was a
previously developed scale (Williams et al.
12
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2009b). In addition, demographic (respondent’s
job title, annual sales revenue for the firm, in
what industry the organization operates, and the
firm’s position in the SC) and firmographic
(SCS breaches, SCS responsibility, and SCS
focus) data were collected about each
respondent’s firm. The firmographic data was
collected in order to better understand any
possible security strategies.
There were several dependent variables captured
in the survey. The purpose of capturing these
variables was to understand and explain
differences in SCS security strategies. As a
result, three dependent explanatory variables
were captured. For the variable security breach,
respondents were asked to indicate the degree to
which their firm had suffered a serious supply
chain breach (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly
Agree). This single item was then split into high
security breach (responses of 6 or 7), medium
security breach (3, 4, or 5) or low security breach
(1 or 2). For SCS responsibility respondents
were asked to self classify their firms’ attitude on
responsibility of SCS by indicating if SCS was
their own (internal) responsibility or the
responsibility of all supply chain partners,
including governments (external). This internal/
external dichotomy is consistent with prior
research (c.f., Williams et al. 2008; Voss et al.,
2009b; Martens et al. 2011). Finally, for SCS
focus respondents were asked to classify their
firms’ attitude as either being primarily focused
on preventing SCS breaches or on responding to
security breaches once they occurred. This
dichotomy is similar to prior suggestions on
prevention versus response as general security
approaches (c.f., Mitroff and Alpaslan 2003;
Arntezen 2010).
The items for each of the measures (except for
demographics and firmographics) are found in
Appendix A. All scaled items used a 7-point
Likert-type response scale (1=Strongly Disagree;
7=Strongly Agree). Although it is beyond the
scope of the study presented here, all these
measures were grounded in initial qualitative
research and subjected to the steps presented in

Churchill (1979). This includes a review of all
the measures by panels of academic experts and
practitioner experts. The survey was refined
based on the expert panel comments and then
pretested through a survey of supply chain and
logistics professionals who were alumni of a
university based in the Midwestern United
States. The pretest produced 65 responses, a
30% response rate and allowed the researchers to
establish the performance of items and
constructs before launching the main data
collection.
Sample Collection and Characteristics
The sample was obtained from the Council of
Supply Chain Management Professionals
(CSCMP). Due to the sensitive nature of the
topic (security) it was suspected that there would
be a low response rate since people in charge of
security are not inclined to talk about it or to
respond to surveys about it. Therefore, a goal
was to solicit many respondents in order to
obtain as many usable responses as possible.
Also, given the strategic-level nature of the
research topic, respondents in executive and
managerial roles with relatively large amounts of
responsibility and knowledge of the questions
being asked were targeted. Responses from
titles such as CEO, VP, Director, and Manager
were sought. The sample purchased from
CSCMP included 2,996 individuals who met
these criteria. When, organizational
redundancies were eliminated (i.e., cleansing the
contact database so that only one respondent per
firm was asked to complete the survey), a
sample of 1,753 firms remained. In total, 62
usable responses (a 3.5% response rate) were
obtained from the CSCMP sample. This
response rate, while low, is similar to other
research using the CSCMP database (e.g., Lewis
2006).
This small number of responses prompted the
researchers to get another sample from a
marketing research firm. The same criteria as
with the CSCMP database was used: one
response per firm from an executive working in
an applicable industry (manufacturing, carriers,

3PLs, warehousers/distributors, and retailers).
This original sample included 3,500 firms. After
eliminating overlap with the first sample and
firms in non-targeted industries (i.e.
consultants), the final sample size was 2,774.
From the adjusted sample, there were 100 usable
responses (a 3.6% response rate).
Two tests had to be run with the data before
analysis. First, the main question with the
separate samples was whether or not the data
should be combined as one group. An ANOVA
was conducted for the items across the samples
and the results indicated no significant
differences existed between the two samples.
Thus, the data sets were combined into a final
dataset of 162 useable responses, representing
162 unique firms, with no redundancies. The
number of useable responses from respondents
at this level (C-level), from exclusive firms,
concerning this topic, compares favorably to
other research on this topic (e.g., Voss et al.
2009a, b; Martens et al. 2011). Next, the
database was then divided into two groups (early
and late) based on the electronic time stamps
that were recorded upon submission.
Differences between early and late respondents
were evaluated using ANOVA. The ANOVA
results suggest that non-response bias was not an
issue with this study. Finally, although missing
data was not an issue with this study, a handful
of missing values were replaced using mean
values.
The overall sample characteristics are found in
Table 1. The job title of the respondent is most
often a Director (25.3%), VP (24.1%), or
Manager (21.6%). Of the named categories,
respondents are most often found in Consumer
Packaged Goods (24.2%), Electronics (9.3%), or
Medical/Pharmaceuticals (6.8%). But it should
be noted that the largest industry category is
Other (36.0%). Relative to SC company role,
the largest group of respondents identify
themselves as manufacturers (45.7%) and the
second largest as 3PLs (19.1%). Annual sales in
dollars are most often greater than one billion
(36.9%).
Spring/Summer 2012
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TABLE 1
OVERALL SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS*
n

%

President/CEO
C-Level
EVP/SVP
VP
Director
Manager

19
13
12
39
41
35

11.7%
8.0%
7.4%
24.1%
25.3%
21.6%

Automotive
Medical/Pharmaceutical
Apparel/Textiles
Electronics
Industrial Products
Consumer Packaged
Goods
Chemical/Plastics
Appliances
Agriculture
Other
SC Position

6
11
7
15
8

3.7%
6.8%
4.3%
9.3%
5.0%
24.2%

Variable
Job Title

Industry

Manufacturer
Carrier
Wholesaler/Distributor
Freight Forwarder
3PL
Warehouser
Retailer
Other
Annual Sales
$1-$1M
$2M-$25M
$26M-$100M
$101M-$1B
Greater than $1B
* N=162

14

39
9
3
5
58

5.6%
1.9%
3.1%
36.0%

74
11
15
4
32
8
11
7

45.7%
6.8%
9.3%
2.5%
19.1%
5.6%
6.8%
4.3%

2
28
29
42
59

1.3%
17.5%
18.1%
26.3%
36.9%
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RESULTS AND FINDINGS
Psychometric Properties
To assess unidimensionality, a factor analysis
using PCA and Varimax Rotation (Netemeyer,
Bearden, and Sharma 2003) was conducted.
Once construct unidimensionality was
confirmed, scale reliability using Cronbach’s
alpha in SPSS was examined. The resulting
alpha values range from .837 to .960 (see
Appendix A), which exceed Nunnally and
Bernstein’s (1994) recommended guideline of
.70. After unidimensionality and reliability of
each construct was confirmed, PCA with
Varimax Rotation was used to assess validity of
the constructs. As Appendix A shows, all items
loaded on the constructs as expected.
Furthermore, all items correspond to one and
only one factor, with most factor loadings well
above .70. This offered evidence of validity.
The assessment of the psychometric properties
suggested sound measurement so the next step
was to explore security strategies.
Cluster Analysis
Since the primary purpose of this study was to
determine whether SCS strategies exist, a threestep cluster analysis process was used to
evaluate security strategies. Cluster analysis is
often used in strategic SC and logistics research
(e.g., Autry et al. 2008; Whipple et al. 2009).
Cluster analysis groups respondents on
similarity, while maximizing the dissimilarity
between clusters (Hair et al. 2006). If the
sample is heterogeneous (i.e., clusters exist),
then the clusters will be described using
attitudinal and firmographic variables, which is
consistent with prior research using this
technique (e.g., Williams et al. 2011)
The cluster analysis was conducted on the six
key security variables (SCS culture, security
communication, operation modification, access
restriction, security services, and security
inspection) that emerged from the literature
review. A multiple step clustering process
follows the suggestion of previous research (i.e.,
Reynolds and Beatty 1999). This was done

because no statistical techniques can determine
the appropriate number of clusters, so the
process remains to some extent subjective.
In the first step, it is suggested that the
appropriate number of clusters should be
approximately between n/60 and n/30, where n
is the size of the sample (Lehmann 1979). Using
the n/60 to n/30 rule of thumb, three to six
clusters is deemed to be appropriate for this
analysis (162/60 and 162/30).
In the second step, hierarchical cluster analysis
was used to identify the number of clusters,
based on Ward’s method, with a squared
Euclidian distance measure. This method is
recognized for its ability to maximize
homogeneity within clusters, while at the same
time maximizing heterogeneity between clusters
(Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984) and is
recommended because it results in clusters with
the smallest sum of squares error (Arabie and
Huber 1994). The largest percentage change in
the agglomeration schedule was evaluated for
clusters between three and six (which were
determined in the first step). According to this
result, the largest change in the agglomeration
schedule comes when three clusters are merged
into two. This indicates that a three cluster
solution may be most appropriate for this
sample.

Finally, the last step was to identify clusters
using a non-hierarchical technique (K-means).
Non-hierarchical techniques do not use a stepwise function like hierarchical techniques.
Instead, this procedure assigns cases to clusters
once the optimal number of clusters (seeds) has
been identified (Hair et al. 2006). Cases are
classified by moving the cases into groups when
they are close to the mean vector of a group
(Landau and Everitt 2004). The numbers of
clusters determined during the hierarchical stage
were used as seed points for the K-means
process. The K-means cluster analysis yielded
three clusters of 31, 71, and 60 respondents in
each.
The case membership of the clusters was saved
in SPSS as a new variable. This allowed for
further analysis in determining an appropriate
number of clusters. According to Hair et al.
(2006), all clusters should be significantly
different on all clustering variables. With three
clusters established, a test was conducted to
determine if the clusters differed on all the
clustering variables. A one-way ANOVA was
used with the three clusters as independent
variables and all SCS activities as the dependent
variables. At the .001 level of significance, the
ANOVA results indicated that there were
significant differences among the clusters on the
clustering variables. This finding indicates that
a three cluster solution represents unique SCS
strategies. Results from the ANOVA are
presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2
ANOVA RESULTS FOR CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT
Security
Variables
SCSC
Op Mod
AR
SS
Inspect
Comm

PValue
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Cluster 1
Means
2.88
4.67
4.62
2.23
3.42
3.30

Cluster 2
Means
5.77
6.15
6.57
4.69
6.31
5.84

Cluster 3
Means
4.29
5.87
6.18
2.87
5.56
5.07
Spring/Summer 2012
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With clusters developed, and different security
strategies revealed; demographic variables,
along with attitudinal variables, were analyzed to
describe each cluster.
Cluster Interpretation
For discussion purposes, each cluster was
named. The cluster name was developed from
the “theme” of the cluster as assessed through
the variable means. Naming clusters based on
themes of the groupings follows best practice in
supply chain and logistics research (e.g.,
Williams et al. 2011). Based on the results, the
clusters were labeled as: 1) The “Laggards”; 2)
The “Advanced”; and 3) The “Compliant”.
Table 3 shows demographic descriptions of each
cluster. Additional descriptions of the clusters
follows.
Cluster 1: The “Laggards”
These firms represent 19.1% of the sample and
are comprised primarily of manufacturers
(61.3%); are in the consumer package goods
(CPG) industry (12.9%); and have sales of
$26M-$100M (33.3%). The slight majority
view SCS as an internal responsibility (55.2%);
have a response focus (58.6%); and
overwhelmingly do not feel that they have
experienced a serious SCS breach (80.0%). In
terms of security perceptions, this cluster had the
lowest scores on all six SCS strategy elements,
in comparison to other segments. As a result,
this group is named the “Laggards” for
discussion purposes.
Cluster 2: The “Advanced”
This cluster represents the largest portion of the
sample at 43.8%. This cluster is mostly
comprised of manufacturers (33.8%) and 3PLs
(25.4%); are involved with CPG industry
(28.2%); and have annual sales in excess of $1B
(39.4%). The vast majority view SCS as the
shared responsibility of all supply chain partners
(78.9%); have a prevention focus (93.0%); and
is the cluster with the greatest perception that
their firms have experienced a serious SC breach
(8.5% have a high perception and 25.4% have a
medium perception). In terms of security
16
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perceptions, this cluster had the highest scores
on all six SCS strategy elements, in comparison
to other segments.
Cluster 3: The “Compliant”
This cluster is the second largest part of the
sample with 37.0%. In this cluster, 51.7%
identified themselves as manufacturers; as with
the previous two clusters, the majority are in the
CPG industry (25.4%). In terms of sales, 40.7%
have sales of greater than $1B. The majority
view SCS as the shared responsibility of all
supply chain partners (71.7%); have a prevention
focus (75.0%); and is the cluster with the lowest
percentage of serious supply chain breach
(1.7%). Firms in this cluster scored in the
middle on all attitudinal scores related to SCS, in
comparison to other segments.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The first goal of this research was to understand
if more than one approach to SCS exists. The
cluster analysis reported here supports this
finding; the categories that emerged from the
analysis follow a proactive (Advanced), do the
minimum necessary (Compliant), or try to do as
little as possible (Laggard) approach. An
interesting finding is that there is good
representation across the three clusters relative
to annual sales, industry, and SC position. That
is, the three strategies identified are not
exclusive to any particular industry, SC position,
or firm size; rather, each strategy is found in
practice regardless of demographics. This
supports the generalizability of these findings.
Also, within cluster rankings of activities do not
vary much between the three groups (i.e.,
Advanced and Compliant both rank Access
Restriction as number one; Laggards and
Compliant rank Inspection as number three; all
three clusters rank Communication, SCS
Culture, and Security Services as number four,
five, and six, respectively). However, the groups
vary significantly on the intensity in which they
do each activity.
Laggards have likely given little thought to
engaging in holistic security activities and may

TABLE 3
CLUSTER DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES*
Variable
Cluster
Laggards
Advanced
Compliant
Annual Sales
(N = 31; 19%) (N= 71; 44%) (N = 60; 37%)
$1-1M
0.0%
0.0%
3.4%
$2M-25M
16.7%
22.5%
11.9%
$26M-100M
33.3%
14.1%
15.3%
$101M-1B
26.7%
23.9%
28.8%
$1B+
23.3%
39.4%
40.7%
Industry
Automotive
Medical/Pharmaceutical
Apparel/Textiles
Electronics
Industrial Products
CPG
Chemical/Plastics
Appliances
Agriculture
Other
SC Position
Manufacturer
Carrier
Wholesaler/Distributor
Freight Forwarder
3PL
Warehouser
Retailer
Other

3.2%
6.5%
0.0%
9.7%
6.5%
12.9%
6.5%
3.2%
3.2%
48.4%

4.2%
4.2%
7.0%
9.9%
5.6%
28.2%
7.0%
2.8%
2.8%
28.2%

3.4%
10.2%
3.4%
8.5%
3.4%
25.4%
3.4%
0.0%
3.4%
39.0%

61.3%
9.7%
3.2%
0.0%
16.1%
3.2%
3.2%
3.2%

33.8%
7.0%
11.3%
5.6%
25.4%
7.0%
7.0%
2.8%

51.7%
5.0%
10.0%
0.0%
15.0%
3.3%
8.3%
6.7%

SCS Responsibility
Responsibility is Ours
Responsibility of All

44.8%
55.2%

21.1%
78.9%

28.3%
71.7%

41.4%
58.6%

93.0%
7.0%

75.0%
25.0%

3.3%
16.7%
80.0%

8.5%
25.4%
66.2%

1.7%
25.0%
73.3%

SCS Focus
Prevention Focus
Response Focus
Security Breach
High Perceived SC Breach
Med Perceived SC Breach
Low Perceived SC Breach
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view SCS as a necessary evil. These firms had
the lowest scores for each SCS strategy element.
It is likely that this group views SCS as a forced
requirement as opposed to a strategic activity.
This is supported by the fact that, of the SCS
strategy elements, Operational Modification is
ranked highest by Laggards. These
modifications might be required of the Laggards
by their supply chain partners. It may even be
that these firms attempt to avoid SCS altogether.
This segment did indicate a low perceived
security breach to their supply chain, which may
contribute to this stance on SCS strategy. Some
firms simply do not or cannot justify SCS costs
and gamble that a SC breach is a low risk for
them. Further, if SC partners are implementing
SCS, some partner firms may not feel an
obligation to spend resources on security. For
instance, many U.S. ports have not taken an
aggressive approach to SCS initiatives (Thibault
et al. 2006); thus, many shipping organizations
have indicated taking little security efforts (Rice
and Spayd 2005). Furthermore, Laggards might
not be as involved with complex SCs and thus
view SCS as their own issue and are less
expectant of others assuming responsibility for
SCS. It also may be why these firms are
primarily focused on responding to rather than
preventing security breaches.
The firms that fall into the Compliant group
have different tendencies in regard to SCS.
Compliant tend to comply with accepted security
practice. They have most likely seen the
Advanced-cluster firms develop some SCS
practices and then have attempted to emulate
some of those best practices – just not to the
degree to which the proactive firms have. These
firms may also be suppliers to Advanced firms,
making it necessary for them to comply with
proactive practices imposed by their customers.
Interestingly, this cluster has the lowest
perception that they have experienced a serious
supply chain breach. This adds support to the
perception that these firms might be “forced” to
be compliant by external partners. In addition,
these firms are more prevention focused than
Laggards but not to the degree that Advanced
18
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are. The firms within this group are about
‘average’ or ‘middle of the road’ in their
approach to SCS. They are not the proactive
firms like the Advanced group, but they are
doing more than the bare minimum for SCS.
Advanced approach security proactively. This
group is dedicated to a holistic SCS approach as
they scored highest in all security activities. It is
likely that this group of firms is capable of
dedicating many resources to enhancing SCS
with Access Restriction and Inspections ranked
as the most important. This is most likely
because these firms experience the highest
perception that a high security breech has
already occurred in their SCs. Thus these firms
are heavily prevention focused and view SCS as
the responsibility of all SC members – not just
their own. Perhaps this perception of shared
responsibility for SCS causes these firms to
collaborate more with supply chain partners and,
therefore, they are both required to and, in turn,
require others to integrate many SCS elements
into their strategies.
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS,
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This section addresses the academic and
managerial contributions of the research, some
research limitations, and suggestions for future
research.
Contributions to Literature
Although this is an exploratory study, it does
make contributions to the body of knowledge by
advancing the understanding of SCS and related
strategies. First, this research describes SCS
strategies that organizations implement to create
security in the SC. It has been suggested that
firms need to approach SCS from a strategic
perspective (Sarathy 2006). Unfortunately,
academic research has not provided specific
strategic options for firms to adopt in order to
secure their supply chain. This research is one
of the first to identify and describe detailed
activities and overall SCS categories and is
consistent with prior strategy research in
developing a strategy taxonomy (e.g., Galbraith

and Schendel 1983; Hawes and Crittenden 1984;
Lassar and Kerr 1996; Autry et al. 2008;
Ashenbaum and Terpend. 2010; Keller et al.
2010).
Contributions to Practice
Managers can benefit through identification of
the strategies discovered in this research.
Managers can identify what category their
organizations fall into and then assess their
strength within that strategy cluster. This
research identifies three main ways that firms
can approach securing the supply chain. These
approaches were named: Advanced, Compliant,
and Laggards. As mentioned earlier, no firm
wants its reputation associated with a
catastrophic event, especially if the post-event
investigation might find that they could have
done something to prevent it, but chose not to do
so. No organization wants the label “Laggard”
after the fact.

SCS focus presented interesting results here and
should be evaluated further. Also, future
research may validate the security strategies
presented here in another sample. Finally,
additional research should empirically address
the drivers of supply chain security strategies. In
other words, what forces predict membership in
a particular security strategy cluster?
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
As supply chains become increasingly global,
firms must adopt strategies for the secure flow of
goods from raw material to end consumer.
Furthermore, as security issues are increasing in
importance to many end consumers, this will
likely force all SC members to take a new look
at security measures to ensure consumer
satisfaction; but these measures will come at a
cost to both firms and consumers. The findings
of this study will assist organizations as they
develop strategies for the implementation of
SCS practices.

Limitations and Future Research
The sensitive nature of this study most likely
resulted in the low response rate; however, a
higher response rate might have yielded different
findings so this response rate should be noted as
a limitation of the current study. Furthermore,
other SCS strategy activities could provide
alternative results. Future studies might
investigate other types of SCS strategy elements,
such as government programs (C-TPAT).
In this sample, the Advanced and Compliant
clusters had the majority of their firms classified
as having annual sales in excess of $1B while
the Laggard majority was $26M-100M. Are
Laggard firms Laggards because they have fewer
firm resources to deploy towards SCS or are they
simply too small to require such advanced
practices? Are Advanced firms larger because
they have more advanced SCS practices or are
they simply able to spend more on SCS because
they are larger? Future research needs to address
a causal relationship of security practices on
performance to answer “does security cause
performance”? In addition, the use of the
firmographic variables of SCS responsibility and
Spring/Summer 2012
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APPENDIX A
SCALES/ITEMS, SCALE RELIABILITY, AND FACTOR ANALYSIS
Scale/Item (Scale Alpha)
2SHUDWLRQ0RGLILFDWLRQ Į 
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company makes changes to…
…the way our supply chain operates.
…specific supply chain activities.
…how our supply chain operates with suppliers.
$FFHVV5HVWULFWLRQ Į 
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
…creates restricted access areas at our facilities.
…creates designated areas where visitors are allowed within our facilities.
…strictly controls all access to our facilities.
6HFXULW\6HUYLFHV Į 
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company…
…chooses to work with specialized security firms to create supply chain
security.
…creates security in the supply chain by working with external security firms.
…chooses to place the responsibility of supply chain security on external
security firms.
,QVSHFWLRQ Į 
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
…checks for any contraband in our product/services to prevent them from
being distributed.
…takes efforts to check for potential security breaches before our
product/service is delivered.
…diligently looks at products and processes before being delivered to prevent
security breaches.
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Item Std.
Mean Dev.

ItemtoTotal

Ȝ

5.72
5.81
5.76

1.192
1.076
1.074

.882
.941
.879

.875
.904
.893

6.05
6.13
5.98

1.341
1.211
1.266

.673
.748
.681

.713
.802
.827

3.93

1.794

.831

.845

4.06

1.849

.808

.844

2.65

1.434

.556

.805

5.58

1.675

.835

.812

5.42

1.583

.868

.798

5.43

1.619

.888

.807

APPENDIX A
SCALES/ITEMS, SCALE RELIABILITY, AND FACTOR ANALYSIS
(Continued)
&RPPXQLFDWLRQ Į 
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company makes sure…
…our supply chain members keep us informed of new supply chain security
developments. (Adapted from Morgan and Hunt 1994)

5.19

1.424

.851

.740

…our supply chain members communicate their supply chain security
expectations clearly. (Adapted from Knemeyer et al. 2003)

4.91

1.455

.869

.782

5.13

1.45

.877

.809

4.99

1.46

.822

.827

5.12

1.469

.906

.821

5.01

1.69

.852

.854

4.11

1.77

.857

.855

4.68
4.70
4.84

1.70
1.78
1.70

.923
.906
.906

.908
.871
.889

…our supply chain members let each other know as soon as possible of any
unexpected problems with supply chain security. (Adapted from Anderson
and Narus 1990)
…our supply chain members agree to share critical information among all
chain members to ensure supply chain security.
…to communicate with other supply chain members to ensure supply chain
security.
SCS Culture (From Williams et al. 2009b) Į 
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
…creates a supply chain security focus among all employees.
…makes sure that supply chain security is the first thing on the mind of all
employees.
…makes supply chain security the norm for all employees.
…dedicates efforts to create a supply chain security-focused workforce.
…makes sure that all employees are vigilant toward supply chain security.
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